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The Formation of Peer Reputation among Physicians
and Its Effect on Technology Adoption
Amol Navathe and Guy David
University of Pennsylvania
This paper studies patient volume and the severity of case mix as they relate to
physicians’ human capital accumulation and pace of technology adoption by
exploring a quality signaling mechanism through which physicians build peer
reputation. We show that volume building leads physicians to actively manage
case mix and find that successful surgeries (particularly for difficult cases) raise
future volume, whereas failed surgeries (particularly for easy cases) deplete it.
Surgeons with a high patient census and a low-severity case mix adopt the new
technology more rapidly. These findings highlight the role of peer reputation
for growing practice size and the timing of technology adoption.
I. Introduction
Physicians play a pivotal role in decisions that affect almost every aspect
of health care, and as coordinators of care, their influence spreads across
most segments of the health system. The welfare implications of health
care delivery are centered on patient well-being; patients rely on phy-
sicians for advice and treatment, which makes physicians interesting and
challenging economic agents to study. As physicians gain expertise
through medical education and training, as well as from their experi-
ence, continued education, and peers, it is not surprising that asym-
metric information between physicians and their patients has received
ample attention in the literature (McGuire 2000). While asymmetric
information is at the heart of patient-physician relations, it plays a dif-
ferent role in physician-physician relations. Peer relations may influence
the accumulation of human capital more than patient-physician rela-
tions. In particular, peer relations may influence the professional success
and livelihood of physicians. The impact of peer relations on welfare,
while indirect, may be significant.
In general, peer relations influence decisions made by physicians re-
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Shannon, Kevin Volpp, and Akila Weerapana for helpful discussions. We also benefited
from comments made by participants of the 2008 Annual Health Economics Conference
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from the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, University of Pennsylvania, is
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garding patient flow, continuity of care, diagnosis modality, and treat-
ment options. One of the key decisions made by physicians is their
choice of technology in diagnosis and treatment (Escarce et al. 1995).
New medical technologies are frequently introduced by pharmaceutical
companies and medical device manufacturers, sometimes with involve-
ment of physicians. However, when a technology is introduced, the tim-
ing of its adoption and the extent to which it is used may vary across
those who utilize it (Freiman 1985; Greer 1988; Escarce et al. 1995;
Escarce 1996; Hirth, Fendrick, and Chernew 1996; Burt and Sisk 2005;
Gans et al. 2005). It has been argued that the heterogeneity in the
timing and extent of adoption may be linked to peer relations and that
the nature of professional ties may lead to either underutilization or
overutilization of new technologies from a welfare perspective (Escarce
1996). For example, a delay in adoption of a technology that increases
quality of life and patient survival would lower social welfare.
To the extent that physicians’ utility encompasses more than their
patients’ utility, peer relations may be an important vehicle for achieving
individual lifetime objectives. Specifically, physicians may take actions
to establish, maintain, and enhance their reputation among colleagues
when peer reputation affects their utility directly or indirectly (e.g.,
practice size). Similarly to Diamond (1989), we define peer reputation
as a perceived quality stock by peers.1 This stock, though correlated, is
different from the stock of human capital since it can be augmented
or depreciated as past patient outcomes are translated into signals for
physician quality among peers. Physician quality is defined as the like-
lihood that a physician will produce a positive outcome on any given
case (higher likelihood means higher quality). Physicians possess strong
incentives to manage the perceptions of colleagues about their own
quality because of the referral mechanism through which they receive
patients. Naturally, the physician’s years in practice, board certification,
and training may serve as a quality signal for peers as well. Referring
physicians are charged with matching their patients with the most ap-
propriate physician for a particular treatment and, given the repeated
nature of peer interactions, may retain an incentive to track perfor-
mance of peer physicians and surgeons over time (Gurmankin et al.
2002; Schwartz, Woloshin, and Birkmeyer 2005).2
Because peer reputation is itself unobservable in the data, study of
its formation as well as its effect on optimal timing of adoption neces-
sitates a theoretical construct to provide a link to empirical analysis.
1 Diamond (1989) describes reputation as “arising from learning over time from ob-
served behavior about some exogenous characteristics of agents. Reputation effects on
decisions arise when an agent adjusts his or her behavior to influence data others use in
learning about him” (829).
2 Physician referral recommendations have been shown to influence patient decisions,
and patients indicate physician referral as a key factor in determining the best surgeon
for their particular case (Schwartz et al. 2005).
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The literature on quality signaling for experience and credence goods
has largely focused on the role of contractual commitment mechanisms
that enhance producer liability as a signal rather than the informational
content of outcomes (Spence 1977; Wilson 1980; Klein and Leffler 1981;
Shapiro 1983; Akerlof 2000).3 Klein and Leffler (1981) point to the role
of prices for signaling product quality. Shapiro (1983) extends the idea
to perfectly competitive markets and demonstrates that the price pre-
mium is the return on investment in reputation. Allen (1984) shows
that while warranties signal quality, consumer moral hazard leads pro-
ducers to offer partial warranties, which do not eliminate the role of
reputation in signaling product quality.
In this paper, we advance a model in which physicians synthesize
signals for quality through their outcomes into a stock of peer repu-
tation, characterized by patient volume and difficulty of surgical cases.4
The model predicts that surgeons with high peer reputations choose a
lower average case difficulty relative to those with low peer reputations
and that a new technology that improves the probability of success is
adopted more rapidly by high peer reputation surgeons than by low
peer reputation surgeons.
To test the model’s predictions, we study the extent of new technology
use by Florida-based surgeons who treated abdominal aortic aneurysms
(AAAs) between 1992 and 2006. September 1999 marks the advent of
endovascular aneurysm repair (EVAR) using AAA stent grafts, which
constituted an alternative to open surgery, by using a minimally invasive
technique. Adoption of the new technology requires substantial invest-
ment in specific human capital and influences the mechanism for build-
ing peer reputation and, hence, may affect surgeons’ adoption timing.
AAAs are an important cause of morbidity and mortality, with over
200,000 new diagnoses each year and 15,000 deaths annually, dispro-
portionately affecting those over the age of 60. Correspondingly, sur-
geons perform 55,000 repairs of which 45,000 are elective on a yearly
basis (Fleming et al. 2005).
We find evidence supporting the quality signaling mechanism un-
derlying our theory, even when controlling for the physician’s focus
(share of AAA cases), years in practice, board certification, and fellow-
ship indicators. Specifically, we find that surgical success builds volume
faster on relatively difficult cases, whereas surgical failures deplete vol-
ume faster on relatively easy cases. For example, an increase of one
standard deviation in the success rate on relatively difficult cases leads
3 A notable exception, in the case of investment in advertising, can be found in Ehrlich
and Fisher (1982).
4 To best understand the mechanism underlying the synthesis of outcomes into signals
for quality, we conducted a series of semistructured interviews with surgeons in both the
academic and community settings. The set of questions focused on peer reputation def-
inition and building, surgery allocation across physicians and the influence of referrals
and scheduling, learning and specialization, and institutional reputation vs. reputation.
Repeated thematic commonalities guided our formulation of the conceptual framework.
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to a 9.1 percent increase in case volume the next year, controlling for
the overall success rate. Furthermore, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the failure rate on relatively easy cases increases the likelihood that
a surgeon permanently quits AAAs by 0.51 percent. This highlights the
role of rare events (i.e., success on difficult cases or failure on easy ones)
in forming a signal for quality. We also show evidence, consistent with
our qualitative interviews, that the decision to adopt the technology
under study is made largely by individual physicians.
There seems to be substantial heterogeneity in the characteristics of
early versus late physician adopters (Escarce 1996). For example, age
and years since completion of medical school are inversely correlated
to adoption, whereas board certification, higher reimbursement levels,
specialization, and larger practices are associated with greater adoption
(Freiman 1985; Escarce et al. 1995). Our model suggests that the timing
of adoption and subsequent intensity of use are sensitive to peer rep-
utation above and beyond traditional measures of human capital and
is manifested through the surgeon’s choice of patient case mix severity.
When testing our theoretical predictions regarding the adoption of
EVAR by surgeons, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in
case mix causes between a 1 and 2.3 percent reduction in use of the
minimally invasive technique (corresponding to a range of definitions
for technology adoption).
II. Theory
New medical technologies are thought to improve patient outcomes,
reduce treatment costs, and/or expand the appropriate set of users.
They may confer benefits to patients who would or would not have
otherwise been treated with the old technology. Individuals excluded
from the old technology may constitute both severely ill patients who
would not tolerate the old technology and relatively healthy patients
who were unwilling to bear its risk beforehand.
One way in which a new technology can reduce costs is by shortening
procedure time. As long as the supply of patients is not perfectly ine-
lastic, this reduction will result in higher case volume for the individual
physician.
Technology adoption requires physicians to incur an investment cost,
which includes the cost of equipment and that associated with learning.
This investment involves uncertainty with regard to quality, the appro-
priate patient population, and the chance that the technology is re-
moved. A high degree of uncertainty lowers the attractiveness of early
adoption.
As time progresses and experience with the technology accumulates,
much of the uncertainty around the quality of the technology, its target
patient population, and the effective ways to learn its associated tech-
niques is resolved. The decrease in learning costs will be substantial,
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especially when the new technology changes the practice of medicine
and requires a new set of skills. Such skills may be considerably different
in nature compared to the traditional skills required in the particular
surgical discipline.
In evaluating the influence of physician peer reputation on the de-
cision of when to adopt a new technology, we first consider the mech-
anism behind reputation building. This part of the model develops a
conceptual framework for the formation and dynamics of peer repu-
tation.
A. Reputation Formation and the Signaling of Quality
Patients select physician specialists primarily through formal networks
(e.g., primary care networks, insurers, etc.) in which referrals play an
important role. The more complex the patient’s condition, the greater
the value of employing these formal networks to ensure the best match
between the patient and a physician.
The mechanism through which physicians accumulate patient volume
is attracting referrals from their peers based, in part, on their perceived
quality.5 Case difficulty (e.g., patient severity) and outcomes are the most
observable signals colleagues receive about a physician’s quality and
therefore the most important determinants of reputation among peers.
The stock of peer reputation for each physician is defined as a profile
of signals resulting from the interaction between case difficulty and
patient outcome. Successful medical interventions enhance the physi-
cian’s peer reputation whereas failure in such interventions reduces his
or her peer reputation.
There is a growing economic literature on biased attribution tenden-
cies regarding success and failure (Benabou and Tirole 2002). Van den
Steen (2004) shows that even perfectly Bayesian-rational agents will tend
to attribute success to their own skills and failures to bad luck. While
this growing literature highlights systematic biases in people’s ability to
relate outcomes to skill and/or luck, it is mostly concerned with how
individuals perceive themselves and not how they are perceived by oth-
ers. Empirical evidence suggests that skill is a key determinant of success
(e.g., Gompers et al. 2006) and failure (e.g., Carhart 1997; Cuthbertson,
Nitzschea, and O’Sullivan 2008), and therefore observers would tend
to associate both positive and negative outcomes with ability. Similarly,
little is known about how attribution tendencies vary with the level of
task difficulty; however, informational content of any realization should
be directly related to its likelihood and expectation.
In particular, peer reputation will be more sensitive to relatively rare
5 Garicano and Santos (2004) propose a different mechanism for within-firm referrals,
governed by the firm, and based on the notion of efficiency in production (i.e., matching
task to talent).
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events, such as succeeding on a difficult case or failing on an easy one.
These attribution tendencies of peer physicians are stronger under im-
perfect risk adjustment, small patient census of each surgeon, imperfect
information flow within networks, greater heterogeneity in surgeons’
quality, and risk aversion of referring physicians.6
For simplicity, consider an individual surgeon i’s performance, mea-
sured by success rate , on a set of cases. As above, involves both thei ip p
influence of skill and randomness on outcomes. Specifically, assume
, where p is the a priori risk-adjusted average probabilityi ip p f(p, v , m)
of success across surgeons, is individual ability (or skill), and m is aiv
patient/environment idiosyncratic shock. While peers observe these out-
comes, their attribution tendencies and a low patient census for each
physician preclude precise decomposition of into individual skill andip
unobserved external factors.7 Therefore, surgeon performance influ-
ences the value of the reputation signal attributed to success and failure.
The reputation benefit, B, is a function of success and failure signals,
both involving p and the deviation of from p:8ip
ip  p iif p ≥ p
piB(p , p)p (1)ip  p i{ if p ! p.
1 p
This formulation is consistent with greater quality attribution to rare
events, where the attribution tendencies are manifested through dif-
ferent treatment of success and failure. Stated differently, when the
discrepancy between realized success and the probability of success is
large and positive (negative), it sends a strong positive (negative) re-
putational signal.
As expected, the derivative of B with respect to is positive, sinceip
physicians who enjoy greater realized success will have a larger repu-
tational gain:
1 i1 0 if p ≥ piB(p , p) p
p (2)ip 1 i{ 1 0 if p ! p.
1 p
6 We find strong support for this sensitivity (see table 3 below and its discussion).
7 Early career failures may discourage referring physicians from waiting for the sample
size to grow enough to infer skill vs. luck since the process itself may endanger their
patients. This may induce physicians with early failures to cease practice of certain pro-
cedures. We find clear evidence to support this.
8 To simplify our notation we do not carry the superscript i for the reputational benefit,
B.
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More important, the derivative of B with respect to p is always negative:
ip i! 0 if p ≥ pi 2B(p , p) p
p (2 ′)ip p  1 i{ ! 0 if p ! p.2(1 p)
For simplicity, we partition cases into two mutually exclusive catego-
ries: hard cases (H), where p is relatively low, and easy cases (E), where
p is relatively high. Under the formulation in (1) we obtain strong
positive (negative) reputational signals from success (failure) on hard
(easy) cases and weak positive (negative) reputational signals from suc-
cess (failure) on easy (hard) cases, such that (see eq. [2′]).B 1 BH E
High-ability physicians will have higher and higher for a givenB BH E
case compared with low-ability physicians, but as long as the effect of
ability on outcome is independent of the task difficulty, the resulting
ordering is preserved throughout the ability distribution.9 Stated dif-
ferently, high-ability physicians can enhance their reputation faster than
those with low ability.
For a set patient census, the signaling mechanism implies an optimal
mix of hard and easy cases (i.e., case mix). We define a physician’s case
mix, , at time t, as the share of hard cases out of all cases,c c pt t
. Success on hard cases builds volume faster than success onH /(H  E )t t t
easy cases, and failure on easy cases depletes volume faster than failure
on hard cases. Physicians, therefore, retain an incentive to influence
their case mix and thereby manage their reputation as is most advan-
tageous to their objective.
Realization signals are dynamically codified into a stock of peer rep-
utation, through the following law of motion:
R p R  f(H , E ), (3)t1 t t t
where is the change in reputation in period t, which will dependf(H , E )t t
on the magnitude of case-specific reputational benefits, and ,B BH E
weighted by the respective number of hard and easy cases:
f(H , E )p B 7 H  B 7 E . (4)t t H t E t
We assume that peer reputation begins to build from zero once the
physician’s training is completed. In each period t, all physicians in our
model affect their peer reputation stock by influencing their patient
case mix, . While reputable physicians are often in a better positionct
9 While our model ignores the case of multidimensional ability, there is no reason to
think that high-ability surgeons are better at hard cases and worse at easy cases compared
with their low-ability counterparts (as in the case of fishermen and hunters). If that were
the case, the notion of reputation would be task specific and may lead to different results.
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to select specific cases, younger (and less reputable) physicians can
influence their case mix by disproportionately covering the hospital
emergency room or specializing in procedures and technologies that
favor specific patient severity profiles.
For tractability, we ignore the case in which the probabilities of success
and failure are endogenously determined by the physicians’ experience.
Abstracting away from learning will not alter the model’s basic predic-
tions if physicians’ human capital is transferable across easy and hard
cases or if learning is more important for hard cases than for easy ones.
This assertion is reasonable since what makes easy cases easy is that they
are predictable and standard, and by the time a physician’s training is
completed, the scope for learning is limited, especially when compared
to difficult cases.10 In essence, our model tracks human capital accu-
mulation in a more flexible way, allowing the volume of easy and hard
cases to accumulate separately and permitting the outcome, success or
failure, to have a differential effect on future volume. Experience and
peer reputation are clearly related since reputation cannot be built
without experience. However, physicians with similar experience may
have vastly different levels of peer reputation, depending on their per-
formance histories.
The physician’s objective function is to maximize lifetime utility from
income, subject to a time constraint. Income is the product of the total
number of hard and easy cases multiplied by a fixed physician payment
per procedure, :11D
max u(I )p u[(E H ) 7D] t t t
t tH ,Et t
subject to T(R ) ≥ t 7 E  t 7 H ,t E t H t
R p R  f(H , E ). (5)t1 t t t
The time constraint, , is monotonically increasing and concave inT(R )t
mapping peer reputation level to operating room (OR) time; higher
reputation leads to a larger referral base, more influence on OR sched-
uling, permission to simultaneously run multiple ORs, and so forth.
Given the bounded nature of time per day, is bounded above byT(R)
. Correspondingly, there exists an such that, for , . WeT R R 1R T(R)pT
define as the time needed to perform a hard procedure and ast tH E
the time needed to perform an easy procedure. By definition, the more
difficult the case, the more time it consumes ( ).t 1 tH E
10 In the limiting case in which learning is more meaningful on easy cases than on hard
ones, learning provides a competing mechanism for volume building. When learning
affects volume more than reputation, some of the model’s predictions are not valid.
Furthermore, this scenario is not likely to be depicted in our empirical application.
11 While hospital payments often adjust for severity, it is less common for physician
payments. Our predictions are robust to differential payment by severity as long as the
severity adjustments do not make surgeons indifferent between hard and easy cases. More-
over, in our empirical application, physician payments do not vary by severity.
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For simplicity, we ignore any labor-leisure trade-offs by assuming that,
regardless of reputation level, the amount of time spent working is fixed.
In other words, physicians with low volume do not enjoy larger amounts
of leisure by virtue of doing less volume. The residual non-OR working
time ( ) is spent on low-revenue and nonreputation signal-T  T(R)max
generating activities that do not provide direct utility (e.g., dedicating
time to building their practices).
The physician’s task can be expressed as a standard optimal control
problem with the control variables being the number of and casesH Et t
and the state variable being the stock of peer reputation, . SubstitutingR t
in the time constraint from (5) in terms of , we obtain the followingEt
Bellman equation:
V(R )p max [u[I(H , R )] b 7 V(R )]t t t t1
Ht
T(R ) t 7 Ht H tp max u H 7D b 7V(R ) . (6)t t1[ ([ ] ) ]tH Et
The first-order condition is
u(I(H , R )) t Rt t H t1′[H ] 7 1 7D b 7 V (R ) 7 p 0, (7)t t1( )I t Ht E t
and the envelope condition is
′u(I(H , R )) T (R )t t t′ ′[R ] V (R )p 7 D 7 b 7V (R )t t t1[ ]I tt E
f(H , E )t t7 1 . (8)[ ]R t
Using the first-order and envelope conditions, we obtain the following
Euler equation:12
B  BH E′ ′ ′u (I )p b 7 u (I ) 7 1 T (R ) 7 . (9)t t1 t1 ( )[ ]t  tH E
Conceptually, equation (9) introduces a simple intertemporal trade-off
between investment and consumption in standard growth theory by high-
lighting the trade-off between relatively low-profitability hard cases that
build future procedural volume and more profitable easy cases that do
not. The direct utility change in period t equals the discounted direct
utility change in period multiplied by the return to investmentt 1
through the choice of case mix. The rate of return is a product of two
12 See App. A for a derivation
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Figure 1.—Phase diagram for intertemporal reputation
terms: the sensitivity of volume to reputation (measured in units of time)
and the ratio of relative benefits to relative costs of hard and easy cases.
To keep the solution as general as possible we apply the contraction
mapping theorem in the context of (9) to guarantee a numerical so-
lution (Judd 1998). Our state space R is compact and the modulus
; these conditions guarantee that we have a contraction that isb ! 1
monotone in V and has a unique fixed point.13
Figure 1 illustrates the phase diagram for reputation with a stable and
nonoscillatory equilibrium. In equilibrium physicians choose a case mix
that ensures the same level of peer reputation (i.e., ).R p Rt t1
This analysis is similar to some studies focusing on decisions made
earlier versus later in a person’s career and arguing that in equilibrium
the incentives for the employees are to work hardest (Holmstrom 1999)
or choose riskier projects (Diamond 1989) in the beginning of their
careers. Diamond also emphasizes the role of reputation in the devel-
opment of the equilibrium path.
Figure 2 shows the time path for choice of hard and easy cases along
with the total number of cases performed. Early in the physician’s career
the hard caseload rises as rapidly as possible and then slowly begins to
diverge to the steady-state value that keeps reputation constant. The
easy case path is pegged at zero at first and then increases until it reaches
the equilibrium value. As a result, case mix, , is near one early in thect
time path and decreasingly converges to a steady-state value.
13 Under a specific (and simplified) assumption regarding the functional form of u(I)
and , a closed-form solution is available.T(R)
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Figure 2.—Time path of the case choice
B. The Timing and Extent of Technology Adoption
Using our conceptual framework for the formation and dynamics of
peer reputation, which is manifested through patient volume and case
mix, we evaluate the influence of peer reputation on the decision of
when to adopt a new technology. With steady entry of physicians into
the profession, the technology introduction will find individual physi-
cians at various locations along the optimal reputation path based on
the length of their careers and their practice experiences (outcome
realizations).
The adoption of a new technology shifts the probability of success
upward and the expected reputational benefit downward and therefore
weakens the reputation-building mechanism. Success on hard cases may
no longer constitute a rare enough event, and failure on easy cases will
carry a bigger reputational penalty. Therefore, physicians who can ben-
efit from rapid increase in their reputation stock will choose to delay
the adoption of the new technology (i.e., through their choice of cases).
It is important to notice that while the new technology may weaken
reputation-building signals, it may not be clinically superior for all pa-
tients. For example, a new technology may lower both the surgical risk
and the definitiveness of the treatment in a way unattractive to patients
with low surgical risk. Therefore, the new technology does not render
the old one obsolete and would not lead physicians to violate their
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patients’ trust by delaying its adoption.14 The mechanism through which
physicians delay the adoption of the new technology is to gravitate to-
ward patients still suitable for the old procedure.
The physicians who are in steady state choose a fixed case mix. The
decision to adopt will be an optimal stopping problem in which the
physicians weigh the income benefit of switching to the new technology
(and converging to the new reputation equilibrium) versus the fixed
cost of adoption (which will be decreasing over time).
As in Klausen, Olsen, and Risa (1992), physicians in steady state com-
pare the present value for the income stream under the new technology
with the one from the old technology. Technology adoption will affect
the physician’s income stream through three different channels: the
change in patient volume, corresponding to the new equilibrium level
of reputation; the allocation of time in the steady-state case mix; and
the profitability of hard and easy cases under the new technology (i.e.,
decrease in procedure length). The time period at which the present
value of the incremental income stream under the new technology is
equal to the cost of adoption will identify the optimal time of adoption.
In analyzing the decision of when to adopt, we establish a reference
point from which adoption is a feasible element in the choice set: the
time of introduction, . The time elapsed since the time of introductiontI
is , and its corresponding cost is . For simplicity, we treatt t C(t t )I I
the cost of adopting the technology as a decreasing and convex function
(i.e., and ).15 This convexity can be motivated in′ ′′C(7) C (7) ! 0 C (7) ≥ 0
several ways: as time elapses and more physicians adopt the technology,
the price of the equipment decreases more slowly, new information
about the technology comes to bear more infrequently, and the collec-
tive experience with the technology demonstrates diminishing marginal
returns with respect to resolving uncertainty and learning. Our differ-
ential results regarding high- and low-reputation physicians hold even
without adoption costs.
Consider the introduction of a new surgical technology characterized
by a reduction in OR time and potentially improved patient outcomes
(e.g., mortality), particularly for more difficult cases. We also assume
that the reputation-driven OR time, , is not affected directly andT(R)
independently by the adoption decision (i.e., ).T(R)pT
14 The case of new medical technologies rendering older ones obsolete is less appealing
theoretically since the welfare implications of delaying the adoption of a superior tech-
nology are trivial.
15 An alternative cost function could rely on the number of physicians who have already
adopted the technology. With heterogeneity in willingness to pay, e.g., the cost of adoption
will produce identical predictions.
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The discounted present value of the gain from using the new tech-
nology (in utility terms) for the simple case of an infinite horizon is

t
˜Du p b 7 Dutech tech
tp0
′1 B  BH Ep 7 u( ) ( )′ ′[1 b B 7 t  B 7 tH E E H
B  BH E u 7T. (10)( )]B 7 t  B 7 tH E E H
The adoption time, , chosen by the lifetime utility-maximizing physi-tA
cian is obtained when . This is lower than under˜Du p C(t  t ) ttech A I A
the finite-horizon case, so it forms a lower bound. Without adoption
costs, steady-state physicians would adopt the new technology instan-
taneously (i.e., ).t p tA I
Next we turn to physicians who have not yet reached steady state.
These physicians, characterized by a lower reputation, have a smaller
patient volume and therefore lower per-period income until they reach
steady state. Given their limited patient volume, they may not have the
ability to alter their reputation levels rapidly by shifting their case mix.
Thus, by adopting the new technology they will be moving from one
reputation path to a different one, while converging more slowly than
if they continued to use the old technology.
Figure 3 plots the two phase lines for the old and new technologies
and their corresponding steady-state levels E and . The steady-state′E
peer reputation level is lower under the new technology since the cost
of acquiring reputation increases. The decisive factor determining
whether or not adoption will be delayed is the physician’s current level
of peer reputation stock. Off-steady-state physicians whose reputation
level, , is equal to or above the new technology steady-state level,R t1
, will adopt the new technology instantaneously and hence move to′E
the new technology phase line (i.e., ). Physicians whose reputationt p tA I
level is strictly below will choose such that they reach′E t 1 t R pA I t1
by .′E tA
A corner solution exists, in which all physicians adopt the new tech-
nology at , when the new technology creates efficiency gains so greattI
that they render the reputation-building mechanism virtually ineffective.
As long as adoption of technology is gradual, our theoretical analysis
suggests that low-severity case mix and high patient volume are among
the characteristics of early adopters.
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Figure 3.—Phase diagram for intertemporal reputation for different technologies
III. Empirical Analysis
We test the predictions from our theoretical framework on the timing
and extent of new technology use by Florida-based surgeons who treated
AAAs between 1992 and 2006. Until September 1999, surgeons repaired
AAAs exclusively with traditional open surgery. Subsequently, the advent
of a new technology, EVAR using AAA stent grafts, introduced a choice
between the technologies and the decision of when to adopt.
Surgeons who perform AAA repair are well suited for studying the
dynamics of reputation building and technology adoption. AAA repair
generates strong reputational signals, due to the combination of high
risk, need for specialized human capital to address technical complexity,
and elective nature of the procedure, that drive physician referrals.
Furthermore, its relative infrequency makes it difficult for peers to infer
whether outcomes result from skill or other factors.
EVAR for AAAs is an ideal new technology in which to study the
physician technology adoption decisions. While there was considerable
uncertainty around long-term mortality, the benefit of minimally inva-
sive procedures on postoperative (short-term) mortality was already well
demonstrated. In spite of the lower postoperative mortality, a corre-
sponding compromise in the definitiveness of treatment made it unlikely
to completely replace open repair techniques; literature at the time of
introduction identified only high–mortality risk patients as potentially
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appropriate for EVAR (Moore et al. 1999).16 While EVAR required phy-
sicians to make substantial investments in both human and physical
capital, it enabled shorter procedure times with comparable physician
reimbursement, thereby increasing the profitability for the adopting
surgeons (Freischlag 2007).17 Finally, the reduced mortality risk with
EVAR, especially on difficult cases, weakened the reputation-building
mechanism, making it an appropriate technology with which to study
the interplay between managing reputation and technology adoption.
A. Data
The data are drawn from the Florida Agency for Health Care Admin-
istration’s inpatient discharge data file and the Florida Department of
Health’s Health Provider Information database. These data for the years
1992–2006 include 1,325 surgeons, 196 hospitals, and 45,093 nonrup-
tured AAA records.
Together these data sources provide a comprehensive set of infor-
mation on patients and the surgeons who treat them over the study
period. These data sources allow tracking of physicians and linking to
data on their characteristics. Furthermore, the older demographic and
large population of Florida make it an ideal laboratory in which to study
the impact of AAA technology since AAAs affect mostly the elderly.
The sample is limited to admissions that have an aortic aneurysm
principal diagnosis (excluding ruptured aneurysm) and a principal pro-
cedure code for either open repair or EVAR.18
The old technology is used exclusively by general, vascular, and tho-
racic surgeons, whereas the new technology, which does not require
open surgery, is also used by interventional radiologists and interven-
tional cardiologists. The latter group is excluded (5.3 percent of phy-
16 Similarly, EVAR was not an option for infrequent anatomically complex aneurysms
that involve other vasculature such as the renal arteries.
The long-term retrospective mortality comparisons between EVAR and open repair
produced mixed results, and clinical guidelines were debated throughout the study period
(Lederle 2004). However, the motivation for EVAR use was almost exclusively based on
improved short-term postoperative mortality.
17 In contrast to physicians, there was considerable debate on the profitability of EVAR
vs. open repair at the hospital level. When considering opportunity costs from increased
volume, EVAR was suggested as more profitable than open repair (Rosenberg et al. 2005).
Hospitals did, however, need to institute catheterization labs in which surgeons could
operate. We demonstrate that our results are robust to accounting for the existence of
catheterization labs in hospitals.
18 Aortic aneurysm admissions and procedures are identified with principal diagnoses
with the following codes from the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9): 441.0–
441.9 and ICD-9 procedure codes 38.44, 38.45, 39.25, 39.71, and 39.73. Our results are
robust to the inclusion of ruptured aneurysm cases (ICD-9 codes 441.1, 441.3, 441.5, and
441.6).
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sicians in the sample) since the paper focuses on technology-switching
behavior.19
Our outcome measure, in-hospital mortality, is an appropriate mea-
sure of the short-term postoperative mortality germane to the theory.
This measure is commonly used for studying surgical procedures, is
likely to be observed by peer surgeons, and is prevalent in the data (5.44
percent in-hospital death rate). Our results are robust to modifications
of the outcome measure using both prolonged length of stay (PLOS)
and PLOS plus in-hospital mortality as the marker for failure. PLOS is
utilized because it is a validated marker for complications (Silber et al.
1999).
We partition cases into hard and easy by mortality risk based on patient
characteristics at the time of admission (Khuri et al. 1997).20 Risk scores
are created using out-of-sample data to avoid the problem of a generated
regressor (Pagan 1984). The standard patient risk model employs a
logistic specification:
Pr {death} p L(b 7 age  b 7 male  g 7 E ).i 1 i 2 i i
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one ifdeathi
the patient died during the hospital admission and zero if he or she
was discharged alive. The variable is the age of the patient, andagei
is an indicator for the sex of the patient being male. The termmalei
is the set of 27 Elixhauser comorbidities used as clinical predictorsEi
of probability of death (Elixhauser et al. 1998). From these variables,
we compute the predicted mortality (risk-adjusted mortality) of each
patient and assign each patient into the easy and hard categories.21
Figure 4 plots the probability of survival by year, case severity, and
technology. The probability of survival for hard cases is lower than for
easy cases, regardless of the technology used, supporting the risk strat-
ification methodology. Moreover, there is dramatic improvement visible
in mortality for hard and easy patients; average survival rates for hard
cases increased from 88.7 percent to 97.1 percent, whereas for easy cases
survival improved from 96.7 percent to 99.4 percent.
19 We exclude a set of anatomically complex AAA cases for which endovascular repair
was not an option (ICD-9 procedure codes 384.6 and 384.7).
20 Our results are robust to alternatively defining emergent cases as hard and elective
cases as easy, an almost orthogonal classification (correlation .12) as may be expected.
Emergent cases can be more difficult for both clinical (time sensitivity secondary to rapid
hemorrhage) and nonclinical reasons (timing of admission, staffing). Mortality risk likely
increases case difficulty through other mechanisms. For example, greater comorbidity may
require an expeditious pace (reduced tolerance to clamping of the aorta and to keeping
anesthesia load low), may result in a more friable aneurysm (e.g., diabetic patients), and
likely necessitates more precise suturing.
21 On the basis of this variable, the patients are categorized into identical buckets in
the same proportions as the risk of mortality variable (23.75 percent minor, 27.33 percent
moderate, 24.59 percent major, and 24.33 percent extreme). The minor and moderate
categories are combined into easy cases and the major and extreme classifications form
the hard cases.
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Figure 4.—Probability of success by case type and technology, 1992–2006
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the surgeons in our sample.
Means and standard deviations are reported for the full sample (1,325
surgeons) and separately for 497 high-volume surgeons and 828 low-
volume surgeons.22 High-volume surgeons have, on average, longer ten-
ure than low-volume surgeons; however, the difference is not statistically
significant.23 Similarly, there is little difference in academic medical cen-
ter affiliation on the patient volume gradient. Vascular surgeons are
more likely to be high-volume surgeons. The magnitude of difference
in volume is very large, with high-volume surgeons performing almost
six times as many AAA procedures in an average year than low-volume
surgeons (8.7 procedures vs. 1.4).
Consistent with a large body of literature on the relationship between
volume and outcome, we find high-volume surgeons to have a higher
overall surgical success rate compared with their low-volume counter-
parts (Luft and Maerki 1987; Gaynor, Seider, and Vogt 2005). In ad-
dition, they are much more likely to succeed on a hard case and less
22 On the basis of interviews and subject to sensitivity analysis, low-volume surgeons are
defined as those performing fewer than three AAA repairs in most years of our sample
and never above six AAA procedures. High-volume surgeons are defined as those per-
forming six or more AAA repairs for most years of our sample. This definition partitions
the full sample because of low within-surgeon volatility over time.
23 We find years of experience to be positively correlated with volume and negatively
correlated with case mix, as the theory suggests.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
Characteristic
Full
Sample
Low-Volume
MDs
High-Volume
MDs
Experience (years) 12.9 12.4 13.8
[8.6] [8.8] [8.3]
Academic medical center ap-
pointment (%) 21 21 21
Graduate medical education (%):
General surgery (only) 63 73 58
Vascular surgery 16 7 21
Thoracic surgery 21 20 21
Board certification (%):
General surgery 46 35 47
Vascular surgery 10 3 21
Thoracic surgery 21 14 32
Other or no board certification 23 48 0
AAA volume 6.1 1.4 8.7
[7.9] [1.2] [8.8]
Case mix .44 .46 .44
[.3] [.43] [.26]
Overall success rate (%) 89 86 90
[21] [29] [16]
Success rate on hard (%) 83 80 84
[29] [37] [25]
Failure rate on easy (%) 5 9 4
[18] [26] [13]
AAA share (%) 3 3 4
[6] [8] [4]
Cumulative share of EVAR, after
introduction (%) 24 21 24
[31] [37] [29]
Number of hospitals with OR
privileges 1.4 1.3 3.1
[.8] [.6] [1.3]
Number of surgeons 1,325 828 497
Number of surgeon-years 7,309 2,603 4,706
Note.—Standard deviations are in brackets.
likely to fail on an easy case. Finally, lower case mix is associated with
higher patient volume.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the patient population in our
sample, unadjusted for surgical risk and provider characteristics. The
table reports separate statistics for the periods before and after the
availability of EVAR and further partitions patients treated in the post-
innovation period into those treated using open surgery (10,783 pa-
tients) and those treated using EVAR (9,459 patients). Faced with the
choice of technology, patients who underwent open procedures were
younger than those treated with EVAR. This is not surprising since
minimally invasive techniques were, in part, targeted for older patients
with higher surgical risk. Finally, the use of EVAR is associated with
lower mortality (1.5 percent vs. 6.9 percent) and shorter hospital stays
(4 vs. 10.5 days).
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TABLE 2
Patient Characteristics by Procedure and Time Period
Characteristic
1992:1–2000:3
Open
(n p 24,851)
2000:4–2006:4
Open
(n p 10,783)
EVAR
(n p 9,459)
Patient age (years) 71.05
[9.7]
69.75
[12.6]
73.94
[8.5]
Female (%) 21 25 15
White (%) 92 87 91
Number of Elixhauser comorbidities:
% of patients with 0 15 8 11
% of patients with 1 36 24 30
% of patients with 2 35 31 31
% of patients with 3 or more 14 37 28
Three strongest mortality-associated
Elixhauser comorbidities:
% of patients with coagulopathy 7 12 4
% of patients with congestive
heart failure .4 .6 .2
% of patients with renal failure 3 6 5
Mortality rate (%) 6.3 6.9 1.48
Length of stay (days) 10.22
[7.94]
10.5
[10.86]
3.86
[4.96]
Note.—Standard deviations are in brackets.
Surgeon adoption of new technology was gradual over the sample
period. Using a stable panel of surgeons who performed AAA repairs
prior to the introduction of EVAR and continued to operate throughout
the subsequent sample period, figure 5 plots the share of surgeons who
have adopted the new technology by year and quarter. In the fourth
quarter of 2000, one year after EVAR was introduced, a procedure code
was assigned, enabling tracking of EVAR procedures. At that point in
time 17.7 percent of surgeons had already adopted EVAR. By the end
of 2006, following steady adoption, 80.8 percent of surgeons had treated
patients with the new technology. This finding is consistent with previous
studies of technology adoption by surgeons (Escarce et al. 1995; Escarce
1996).
The decision to adopt AAA stent grafts is largely made by individual
surgeons and to a lesser degree by the institutions with which they are
affiliated. Even though the adoption of EVAR generally requires an in-
hospital catheterization laboratory, a decision that is primarily at the
hospital’s discretion, our findings are robust to the existence of such
labs. In Appendix B we present some evidence consistent with surgeon-
level adoption.
B. Reputation Formation and the Signaling of Quality
This subsection evaluates the reputation-building mechanism that un-
derlies the subsequent technology adoption analysis and corresponds
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to the theoretical discussion in Section II.A. Specifically, we test that
succeeding on difficult cases builds volume more rapidly than succeed-
ing on easy cases and that failing on easy cases depletes volume more
rapidly than failing on difficult cases.
To do this we pursue six different specifications. The first specifica-
tion, in equation (11), identifies the effect of replacing a failure with a
success on a hard case on the next period’s volume:
Volume p SH 7 a SE 7 b FE 7 dW g Yi,t i,t1 i,t1 i,t1 i,t1 t
MD   , (11)i i,t1
where is the physician-year specific AAA volume in the currentVolumei,t
year; is the 1-year lagged number of successes on hard cases;SHi,t1
and are the lagged number of successes and failures onSE FEi,t1 i,t1
easy cases, respectively; are time-varying surgeon-level controls in-Wi,t1
cluding lagged AAA volume, lagged case mix index, lagged share of
AAA cases out of all cases, and years of experience; is a set of yearYt
dummies; and is a set of individual surgeon fixed effects.MDi
The coefficient on captures the effect of turning a failure onSHi,t1
a hard case into a success on a hard case. This is the case since both
volume and case mix are held constant. The expected sign on a is
positive according to the predictions from theory.
Similarly, we employ a second specification in which we identify the
volume effect of replacing a success with a failure on an easy case. In
this specification success on easy cases is the reference group, and the
sign of the coefficient estimate is expected to be negative.
A third specification combines the two elements discussed in the first
two specifications by representing success and failure using rates. The
success rate on hard cases and the failure rate on easy cases are used
as regressors:
Volume p SH_Rate 7 a FE_Rate 7 bW g Yi,t i,t1 i,t1 i,t1 t
MD   , (12)i i,t1
where and are the lagged fractions of successesSH_Rate FE_Ratei,t1 i,t1
on hard cases and failures on easy cases, respectively. All controls are
identical to the prior specifications. In this equation, a identifies the
effect of success rates on hard cases, for which we expect a positive sign,
and b identifies the effect of failure rates on easy cases with an expected
negative sign.
Our fourth specification explores the effect of the overall success
(failure) rate on the change in volume regardless of case severity. Our
fifth specification evaluates the volume effect from the success rate spe-
cific to hard cases beyond the surgeon’s overall success rate. Our final
specification evaluates the effect of the interaction between severity and
case mix on future volume.
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Thus far we have treated the volume effect of failure on easy cases
as an intensive margin phenomenon. Alternatively, failure on easy cases
may be driving attrition of surgeons from our sample. To deal with this
issue, we use a stable panel of surgeons as well as replicate all six spec-
ifications using a lead variable for attrition. The dependent variable
is an indicator variable that equals one if the surgeon’sQuit_AAA i,t
AAA volume is zero from the next time period onward.24 We expect
higher failure rates/counts to positively affect surgeon attrition.
In all specifications, surgeon fixed effects are used to account for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that could affect the attribu-
tions of quality. This helps mitigate concerns that the relationship be-
tween lagged performance and volume observed in the cross section is
driven by composition effects, ensuring that the performance param-
eters in (11) and (12) are identified from changes in volume within
surgeons. Following Gibbons and Bhaumik (2001), regressions are
weighted by volume.
The results from estimating the six specifications are summarized in
table 3.25 Rows correspond to specifications 1–6 and report the coeffi-
cient estimates of interest. Column 1 reports results for the full sample;
columns 2 and 3 report results separately for low- and high-volume
surgeons; columns 4 and 5 report results separately for procedures using
the old and the new technologies; column 6 reports results for the full
sample and uses the lead of surgeons’ attrition (quit AAA in next period)
as the dependent variable; finally, column 7 reports results for the stable
panel of surgeons who perform AAA procedures throughout the sample
period (stayers).
We find that success has a positive effect on future volume, with a
one-standard-deviation improvement in the overall success rate leading
to a 6.7 percent increase in next period’s number of AAA cases. There
is also evidence that success on hard cases builds volume; replacing a
single failure with a success on a hard case improves future AAA volume
by 0.17 case. The third specification suggests that a one-standard-devi-
ation increase in success rate on hard cases leads to an approximately
5.7 percent increase in next period’s number of AAA cases. Success on
hard cases is shown to be important for building future volume even
when we control for overall success rates, supporting the reputation-
building mechanism described in Section II.A. Specifically, improving
the hard case specific success rate by one standard deviation leads to a
9.1 percent increase in next period’s number of AAA cases.
The volume effects of failure on easy cases are mixed. In the case of
24 The bulk of surgeons who stop doing AAA procedures neither relocated away from
Florida nor left the profession but rather continued to perform non-AAA operations.
25 All results are robust to the inclusion of hospital fixed effects and alternative risk
identification strategies, such as using a patient risk model based on other vascular con-
ditions and using emergent cases as hard. We also perform a Hausman test on the fixed-
effects models and reject the absence of endogeneity.
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surgeons using the new technology, failure tends to deplete subsequent
volume. Our theoretical predictions suggest a higher penalty for failure
with the new technology compared to the old technology.26 While this
is true in some specifications in the old technology sample, in some
cases we find a positive association between failure and future volume.
These results are likely to reflect a spurious correlation driven by attri-
tion of poor performers. A closer look at attrition (col. 6) suggests that
this is indeed the case, with failure on easy cases leading to a higher
probability of quitting AAA procedures. Even when we control for the
overall failure rate, a one-standard-deviation increase in the failure rate
on easy cases increases the likelihood of a surgeon abandoning AAA
repairs by 0.51 percent. Furthermore, limiting the analysis to the sub-
sample of stayer surgeons reverses the sign on the coefficient estimate
on failure on easy cases. Replacing a success with a failure on an easy
case, for stayer surgeons, causes a reduction in 0.5 AAA case in the next
period.
C. The Timing and Extent of Technology Adoption
This subsection tests our prediction that high-reputation surgeons, char-
acterized by a relatively low case mix and high volume, will adopt a new
technology faster than low-reputation surgeons. We evaluate the effect
of case mix and volume on the timing of adoption using four estimation
models: cross-sectional, hospital fixed effects, surgeon fixed effects, and
hospital-surgeon fixed effects. The estimation equation is
Adoption p Case mix 7 a Volume 7 bW g X l Yit it it it i t
MD   . (13)i it
The dependent variable, , is a measure of the level of newAdoptionit
technology use by surgeon i in year t. For robustness, we use four dif-
ferent definitions of technology adoption: (1) Adoption p cumulative
share of cases using EVAR, after introduction. The share of cases using
EVAR is computed out of all AAA cases (using both EVAR and open
repair) from the time at which EVAR was introduced. (2) Adoption p
cumulative share of cases using EVAR, after the first use. This is the
same as the previous definition except for the treatment of surgeons
delaying adoption. Under this measure, surgeons are excluded from
the sample until their first use of EVAR. (3) Adoptionp share of cases
using EVAR: the number of cases using the new technology out of all
AAA cases performed. (4) Adoption p used EVAR ≥ 5 times. To avoid
26 Note that while the larger penalty for failure on easy cases with the new technology
is consistent with the theory, the larger reward for success on hard cases with the new
technology is not. However, the effect of success and failure with the new technology may
be correlated with the success and failure profile with the old technology and, more
important, with the adoption decision itself.
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sensitivity to potential measurement error, this measure uses an indi-
cator variable that equals one once a surgeon performs five EVAR pro-
cedures cumulatively. Moreover, for the first three fractional measures
of adoption, there is a concern when using linear functional form in
our fixed-effects analysis, which ignores the bounded nature of the var-
ious adoption share measures (Papke and Wooldridge 1996, 2008).27
This fourth adoption model is free of the fractional response concern
and serves as a robustness check for the first three measures.
As in Escarce et al. (1995), time-varying controls ( ) include theWit
surgeon’s share of AAA cases out of all cases, the share of patients with
commercial insurance, the percentage of patients enrolled in a health
maintenance organization (HMO), and the number of years in practice;
is the set of year dummy variables; and is the error term. The cross-Y t it
sectional model includes a number of time-invariant controls ( ): theXi
case mix index and aggregate patient volume accumulated prior to
availability of the new technology, an indicator for whether the surgeon
has an appointment at an academic medical center, and dummy vari-
ables for fellowship and board certification in vascular surgery.
We allow the number of years in practice to have an independent
effect on the extent and timing of adoption of the new technology.
Physicians with more years in the profession will inadvertently have more
years of experience with the older technology and therefore may prefer
it. In addition, they may have a shorter time horizon in which to cap-
italize on the investment required in the new technology. These con-
siderations may lead surgeons with longer tenure in the profession to
adopt the new technology later or not at all. However, older surgeons
may have large enough practices to accrue substantial gains from time-
saving characteristics of the new technology. Moreover, older surgeons
may better understand the limitations of the old technology, and high-
volume practices are likely to include patients particularly suited for the
new technology.
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (13) under the
four estimation models. Each column reports results for four variables:
case mix, lagged AAA volume, lagged AAA share of total cases, and years
of experience.28 For the two specifications with no physician fixed effects
we also report results for board certification and fellowship in vascular
surgery.
We find that the higher the lagged patient volume, the faster surgeons
adopted EVAR. While this is consistent with a reputation-building mech-
anism, this finding is also consistent with other equally parsimonious
27 Consistent results were found when using a fractional logit model.
28 Findings are robust to partitioning of cases into emergent and nonemergent as well
as to the inclusion of prolonged length of stay as the outcome variable (both separately
and combined with mortality). Similarly, stratifying the analysis by high- and low-volume
physicians did not alter the results in table 4.
This content downloaded from 130.091.116.052 on June 06, 2016 07:16:52 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Peer Reputation among Physicians 315
mechanisms. For example, surgeons with larger practices will be able
to spread the fixed cost of investment in equipment and skills across a
larger patient census. The relationship between volume and speed of
adoption is documented in the literature (Escarce et al. 1995; Hoppe
2002).
We find a negative effect of lagged case mix on surgeon’s speed in
adopting the new technology, which is robust across all estimation mod-
els and definitions of technology adoption. When we use cumulative
share of cases using EVAR, after introduction the point estimate on
lagged case mix (in the most saturated model) produces a highly sta-
tistically significant estimate of0.026. This implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the share of hard cases leads to approximately a
1 percent decrease in the use of EVAR (measured as a share of all AAA
procedures). This effect is larger using other definitions of adoption
(ranges from 1 percent to 2.3 percent) and is negative and significant
regardless of the estimation model. Our results were not altered by the
inclusion of an in-hospital catheterization laboratory indicator.29
The negative relationship between case mix and timing of adoption
supports the prediction of the theoretical model in Section II.B, espe-
cially since it is not a priori obvious why for a new technology that
putatively was more applicable to difficult cases, surgeons with a more
severe case mix delay adoption. In addition to case mix and AAA volume,
we also find that a higher share of a surgeon’s practice that is dedicated
to AAAs is associated with faster adoption.
As expected, the surgeon’s years of experience has an independent
effect on the timing of adoption, such that surgeons with more expe-
rience adopt the technology faster. In the cross-sectional and hospital
fixed-effects models, none of the human capital variables (including
years of experience, board certification, and fellowship in vascular sur-
gery) were statistically significant.
IV. Discussion
This study aims to take a first step toward understanding the role of
peer relations in the provision of physician services. The links between
surgical success and volume building, as well as between failure and
volume depletion and attrition, indicate responsiveness to the quality
information contained in outcomes. The market seems to punish failing
surgeons with an emphasis on those who fail on easy cases and reward
more generously those who succeed on relatively difficult cases. This
29 In the most saturated version of the model, where both surgeon and hospital fixed
effects were included, the effect of lagged case mix almost doubles in magnitude when
including an in-hospital cardiac catheterization laboratory indicator. This indicator variable
is time varying since the share of general hospitals with catheterization labs increased
from 47 percent in 1992 to 73 percent by 2006.
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TABLE 4
The Effect of Lagged Case Mix on the Timing of Technology Adoption
Explanatory Variable OLS
Hospital
Fixed
Effects
Physician
Fixed
Effects
Physician 
Hospital
Fixed
Effects
A. Dependent Variable: Cumulative Share of Cases
Using EVAR, after Introduction
Case mix lagged .058* .048** .025*** .026***
[.036] [.02] [.004] [.004]
AAA volume lagged .0085*** .004*** .00060*** .0007***
[.002] [.001] [.0001] [.0001]
AAA share of total cases lagged .66 1.24*** .48*** .47***
[.5] [.3] [.04] [.03]
Years of experience .0027 .0011 .0325*** .0327***
[.0022] [.0017] [.0004] [.0005]
Board certification .0014 .0147
[.0385] [.02767]
Fellowship .0303 .0223
[.04331] [.0276]
B. Dependent Variable: Cumulative Share of Cases
Using EVAR, after First Use
Case mix lagged .035 .049* .036*** .034***
[.04] [.026] [.005] [.005]
AAA volume lagged .0057*** .0025** .0004*** .0005***
[.002] [.001] [.0001] [.0001]
AAA share of total cases lagged .47 .86*** .37*** .35***
[.5] [.3] [.02] [.02]
Years of experience .0035 .0016 .0249*** .0251***
[.0025] [.0021] [.0005] [.0005]
Board certification .0283 .0324
[.0387] [.0286]
Fellowship .0584 .0415
[.0461] [.0310]
C. Dependent Variable: Share of Cases Using
EVAR
Case mix lagged .049 .050* .040*** .034***
[.04] [.03] [.01] [.01]
AAA volume lagged .0072*** .002 .0017*** .0015***
[.002] [.001] [.0002] [.0002]
AAA share of total cases lagged .68 1.25*** .65*** .61***
[.6] [.3] [.05] [.05]
Years of experience .0024 .0026 .0456*** .0465***
[.0027] [.0017] [.0010] [.0010]
Board certification .0417 .0227
[.0381] [.0294]
Fellowship .0378 .0358
[.0477] [.0298]
D. Dependent Variable: Used EVAR ≥ 5 Times
Case mix lagged .053 .057 .02* .024*
[.05] [.05] [.01] [.01]
AAA volume lagged .011*** .007** .0008* .0007
[.004] [.004] [.0005] [.0005]
AAA share of total cases lagged .38 .84 .46*** .46***
[.97] [1.0] [.1] [.1]
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TABLE 4
(Continued)
Explanatory Variable OLS
Hospital
Fixed
Effects
Physician
Fixed
Effects
Physician 
Hospital
Fixed
Effects
Years of experience .0003 .0049* .0731*** .0738***
[.0032] [.0029] [.0016] [.0016]
Board certification .0818 .0401
[.0611] [.0538]
Fellowship .0089 .0389
[.0581] [.0498]
Inpatient data time-varying sur-
geon characteristics X X X X
Inpatient data time-invariant sur-
geon characteristics X X
Physician data time-varying sur-
geon characteristics X X X X
Physician data time-invariant sur-
geon characteristics X X
2R .395 .7 .957 .959
Note.—Robust standard errors are in brackets. For OLS and hospital fixed-effect specs,
standard errors are clustered by physician, and for models with physician fixed effects,
standard errors use the Huber-White adjustment. Regressions are weighted by patient
volume. Inpatient data time-varying surgeon characteristics include fee-for-service patient
share and HMO patient share; inpatient data time-invariant surgeon characteristics include
pretechnology cumulative case mix and pretechnology cumulative AAA volume; physician
data time-varying surgeon characteristics include years in practice; and physician data
time-invariant surgeon characteristics include dummies for academic medical center ap-
pointment and board certification in general surgery, vascular surgery, and/or thoracic
surgery.
* .p ! .1
** .p ! .05
*** .p ! .01
quantity response is particularly important in the health care setting,
where administrative prices exhibit limited or no variation with respect
to quality of care.30
Peers possess a common knowledge base that provides a similar level
of expertise in judging the quality of services provided. The repeated
nature of the interactions among peers through formal referral networks
is plausibly the mechanism underlying the observed responsiveness to
an individual practitioner’s outcomes.
The ability to track and record the performance of peer surgeons,
while beneficial to patients and essential for reputation building, is
costly. Some may argue that the role of physicians as agents for their
patients should provide sufficient incentives to engage in this behavior.
However, there are no clear financial incentives for peer physicians to
do so. Under existing antikickback statutes, financial transfers are scru-
30 Even the movement toward pay for performance rarely relies on patient outcomes,
but rather uses process measures to inform pricing.
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tinized; yet relaxing these laws is unlikely to generate incentives for
efficient referrals. For example, multispecialty groups that include pri-
mary care physicians and surgical specialists provide a systematic way to
bypass these laws and allow for financial transfers between physicians;
however, such arrangements are not likely to provide incentives specific
for tracking peer performance inside or outside the group.
To encourage physicians to engage in peer assessments, incentives
must target the effort involved in tracking and recording the perfor-
mance of peer surgeons. While some modern trends are likely to reduce
the costs of peer assessments, such as report cards and electronic rec-
ords, others are likely to increase these costs. For example, greater
division of labor along the care continuum reduces the interaction
among physicians.
Our conceptual framework suggests that younger (lower-volume and
higher-severity case mix) physicians delay adoption of new technologies.
This does not imply that surgeons use an inferior technology to show
off their superior ability relative to their peers, but rather that they seek
patients for whom the old technology is considered more appropriate
even after the introduction of the new technology. Our empirical anal-
ysis confirms this prediction, which is counterintuitive to the beliefs
often held in the medical community. The welfare implications of delays
in technology adoption are generally unclear given the role of uncer-
tainty and learning. The finding that higher-volume surgeons adopt
earlier provides some indication of matching of task to talent, since
these surgeons possess greater experience in managing patients targeted
by the new technology.
Finally, it is important to note that our theoretical analysis does not
allow for supply-side incentives that could be influencing adoption pat-
terns as well. It is possible that manufacturers target their detailing
efforts at specific surgeons. While it is likely that these surgeons would
perform many AAA repairs, manufacturers are not likely to target sur-
geons with a lower-severity case mix.
Appendix A
From the first-order condition,
t u(I(H , R )) tH t t H′b 7 V (R ) 7 B B 7 p  7 1 7D.t1 H E( ) ( )t I tE t E
Rearranging and moving back a period, we get
(t  t ) 7DH Eu(I(H , R ))t1 t1′V (R )p 7t
I b 7 (B 7 t B 7 t )t1 H E E H
(t  t ) 7DH E′p u (I ) 7 .t1
b 7 (B 7 t B 7 t )H E E H
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Now, plugging into the envelope condition and defining as′ ′u (7) u (I ){t
, we getu(I(H , R ))/It t t
′(t  t ) 7DH E T (R )t′ ′u (I ) 7 p u (I ) 7 D 7t1 t [ ]b 7 (B 7 t B 7 t ) tH E E H E
(t  t ) 7DH E′ b 7 u (I ) 7t[ ]b 7 (B 7 t B 7 t )H E E H
′T (R )t7 1B 7 .E[ ]tE
Rearranging, we get
′T (R )t′ ′u (I ) 7 (t  t ) 7Dp u (I ) 7 D 7 7 b 7 (B 7 t B 7 t )t1 H E t H E E H[ ]tE
′T (R )t′ b 7 [u (I ) 7 (t  t ) 7D] 7 1B 7t H E E[ ]tE
as long as .B 7 t ( B 7 tH E E H
Distributing terms, simplifying, and advancing forward one period gives the
Euler equation:
B BH E′ ′ ′u (I )p b 7 u (I ) 7 1T (R ) 7 .t t1 t1[ ]t  tH E
QED
Appendix B
To study whether AAA stent graft adoption was driven by a hospital-level decision,
figure B1 plots the share of hospitals by the adoption share and year. The
adoption share is measured as the share of surgeons within each hospital using
the new technology and is divided into six mutually exclusive categories: 0 per-
cent, 1–19 percent, 20–39 percent, 40–59 percent, 60–79 percent, and 80–100
percent.
The key observation here is that hospitals move through the adoption share
categories, from the darkest band to the lightest band, in gradual fashion. There-
fore, adoption of AAA stent grafts is consistent with a within-hospital phenom-
enon as opposed to a between-hospital phenomenon (i.e., a movement from
no surgeons using the technology to all surgeons using the technology).
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Figure B1.—Share of hospitals by share of their surgeons who have adopted EVAR
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